Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated - Part II

               This post is the second part of the the same book from last week. The book published at  http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r30885.pdf

            The concept of autonomy is often perceived as significant in relation to dignity. Gerald Dworkin notes various substantive understandings, including liberty and freedom of the will, and the association of the idea with, for example, self-assertion. Dworkin summarizes the function of autonomy as moral, political, and social idea. The content of degrading treatment case-law indicates that dignity in this social sense is not the concern of degradation in the human rights law sphere. This does not involve damage to reputation or standing acquired in the basis of merit to one's position in societal affairs. The Court's understanding of degradation appears to be defined by the violation of something fundamental, by treating a person in a way that is considered inappropriate for a person to be treated. In relation to rank, position, reputation, or character, however, the Commission statement suggest that this is relevant, but only if it is tied to human dignity. The invocation of the notion of rank is helpful, in understanding the form of violation of dignity that the concept of degradation can be seen to encapsulate. It can indeed be seen to maintain the idea of "grade" and lowering of rank. Alongside those dictionary meaning, others contain the idea of lowering:" to lower in estimation, to bring into dishonour or contempt", to lower in character or quality. It is used to express deterioration of something valuable. This idea of lowering can be seen to capture the key feature of the idea of degradation. This appriach to the term rank is useful in that of present a tie between the idea of rank and use of the concept of dignity in the human rights context. In a discussion, which highlights the contribution of equal high rank amongst human beings, with a sort of universalization for all humans. The understading of degradation is undeniable that has considerable practical weight. The fundamental insight from the degrading treatment jurisprudence of the ECtHR lies in the characterization of degradation in terms of particular conceptual relationship between degradation, humiliation, autonomy, and rank. The term "dehumanization" refers in the most basic terms to the denial, in part or whole, of the humanity of a person or group of persons. It is possible to think of degrees of dehumanization; we might speak of extreme or "mild" forms of dehumanization, the former occurring in instances of, for example, genocide and torture, and the latter in the everyday structures of social, political and economic marginalization. For what these have in common is their foundation in attitudes of exclusion. of which the psychological processes are alike, no matter the severity of the consequences. While systematic exclusion is in most cases a gradual process by which "over time, harms and dissimilarities eclipse benefits and similarities, gradually moving persons and groups outside the scope of justice", it is possible to identify active strategies of dehumanization, such as labeling, which occurs not only in extreme cases but also in the everyday situations . Dehumanization, then, is the process by which human beings are rendered so radically other that it becomes possible for their persecutors to commit murder and for bystanders to stand by without objection or remorso. For this all the humiliation, defamation, degradations: the provision of a false motive to the perpetrators of gross violations. Gentille, the female protagonist of Gil Courtemanche's novel "A Sunday by the Pool in Kigali,"  provides readers with a sense of what dehumanization might means for the victims. Gentille's semi-fictional story recalls countless testimonial narratives of dehumanization in which victims are all too often reduced, through acts of physical and discursive violencen to the status of objectified, fragmented and abject bodies emptied of "human" subjectivity. Human dignity might be understood as a term for the most basic human rights. In this sense human dignity would be violated if the most fundamental liberties and rights were at stake. Human dignity is understood as "the right to have rights". This concept of human dignity refers to some reflections of Hannah Arendt in her analysis of totalitarianism. This concept of human dignity emphasizes the rights-orientation of human dignity. Human dignity as the basis of human rights. This idea is formulated in the context of the human rights framework itself. In the course of Western history the development of the human rights framework was accompanied by the development of specific institutions, like the nation state and democracy. We speak about human dignity as if it were a property of humans like having green eyes or black hair. The formulation that we have human dignity would then articulate the conviction that this moral demand for respect is not constituted in the act of ascribing human dignity. To have human dignity means that we owe this respect to human beings in a categorical sense, which means that the validity of this demand does not depend upon specific laws or specific social practices of respect. This book sketches a partial account of human dignity. According to the account dignity is preeminent and unconditional value, possessed by all persons, that is, beings who have certain psychological capacities, including autonomy. Each person who has the capacities mentioned possesses woth equal to that of every other person, no matter how well- or ill- developed the capacities may be. The questions here are: What philosophical role does human dignity play within the realm of human rights? And the other way around: What exactly is the conceptual function of human rights for preserving human dignity? Constitutional lawyers debating this question have shown that four different alternatives must be distinguished when it comes to explaining and interpreting this interrelation. 1) The Ground of Human Rights: This rest on the assumption that the idea of dignity is the normative basis from which human rights can be derived. Dignity is not itself a human right but the justificatory "ground"  from which to deduce and proclaim concrete human rights. It is because human beings have dignity or equal worth that they also have special human rights. So dignity must be understood as a presupposition for having human rights. as their necessary, but also sufficient condition. 2) A Special Human Rights: Following a second interpretation, human dignity should not be taken as primordially grounding of human rights but rather as a right itself, even though a special one, for this right tells the legal system what the most important human good is that needs protection in constitutional law. This can be seen as a historical insight due to the barbarism of the twentieth century. 3) Dignity as the Sum of Human Rights: The third interpretation takes the notion of dignity as the aggregate or "sum" of human rights. In consequence, the Universal Declaration of Human rights is to be interpreted as a list of necessary aspects of human dignity.  4) Dignity as the Purpose of Human Rights: The fourth interpretation starts by sharing importsnt intuitions of the three others. The historical commitment to human dignity that we can find in the relevant legal documents should be seen as some sort of explicit reason, why we proclaim all human rights today; as necessary legal conditions for living a life in dignity. In consequence, human dignity is the goal of human rights. Every human being can be regarded as equal as we can presuppose that they all have the same human interest to live a life in dignity. Every human being has human rights because we are all deeply vulnerable. Legal protection is needed where dignity of a human being is in acute or severe danger. Not all persons have full dignity, but due to the moral and also political claim that they should all count as legally equal, they all have the same universal rights, which have to be respect, protected and fulfilled. To state it briefly: Because human beings do not already have equal human dignity, they all have equal human rights.

Humiliation, Degradation, Dehumanization: Human Dignity Violated

                   This post is a summary of the book with the title above, it was published in 2011 at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r30885.pdf

               Human dignity is the main philosophical foundation of human rights, as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and many other documents. The concept of human dignity is meant to distinguish human beings from other creatures, notably animals. It underlines the uniqueness of human beings among all creatures, above all their free will, individual autonomy and capacity of independence decision-making based on reason and free moral choice. By focusing on violation of human dignity, the authors adress the question what it means for human beings all over the world to be degraded, humiliated and dehumanized. What do victims of serious human rights violations have in common? In my opinion, it is the experience of absolute powerlessness. By addressing various aspects of human dignity and ways how human beings continue to be deprived by other human beings of this essential aspect of being human, the present volume constitutes an important contribution to the contemporary inter-disciplinary discourse on the relationship between human rights and human dignity. The concept of human dignity is one of few philosophical notions that has gained popular currency beyond academic discourse. Immanuel Kant and other philosophers has found its way into our colloquial vocabulary. Appeals to human dignity are an important part of ethical, legal and political discourse nowadays and appear in constitutions, U.N. documents, and in NGO publications. It is our convinction that any satisfactory conception of dignity should be able to explain the reality of its violation and should not be detached from concrete occurrences and interpretation in social life, since this is what motivates us to talk about dignity. Instead of deducing moral principles from an abstract conception of human dignity, our contributions start from some act or practice that often is or can be characterized as a violation of human dignity. Of course, in order to develop a philosophical concept of human dignity abstract values and human capacities have to be considered as well. We do not want to deny the importance of these matters, but at the same time, we want to emphasize that the phenomena should not be lost from sight. This volume demonstrate the complexity of the phenomena that may be labelled as violation of human dignity. But they also show how conceptions of dignity can bring order to this complexity. This book consist of three parts. In the first part we proceed from what we understand to be some general forms of dignity violations such as humiliation, degradation or dehumanization. Kaufmann and Webster, analyze degrading treatment. From different starting points both draw attention to the role that the concept of dignity might play in describing the wrong that is captured in these general expressions of dignity violations. For example, they point to the close interrelation between dignity and autonomy. Neuhauser shows us that certain forms of humiliation can not be understood without accepting the idea that the dignity of a collective can be violated as well as the dignity of an individual. Though varying in their methods, focus and conclusions, the contributions to this anthology are united in their shared conviction that the widening of interest in dignity beyond the gaze of academic philosophy is to be welcomed, The concept now figures prominently in debates on many social and moral problems of global concerns. Historical accounts of human dignity distinguish four different sources: the Greek and Roman heritage culminating in Cicero's notion of "Dignitas" ; the biblical conception of man and woman as being created in the image of god; Kant's Wurde as opposed to price; and finally, the concept that turned up after 1945 in numerous declarations and constitutional laws. If we want to understand human dignity, we should start with instances of its violations. Instead of attempting to derive a conception of human dignity from normative ethics or anthropology, we should choose start from situations which we are inclined to describe as violations of human dignity and then ask what it is that makes it so appealing to use this concept of referring to, for example, harming, infringing autonomy or violating human rights. In Germany the debate on human dignity flared up some 10 years ago as part of the bioethical discussion on the status of the human embryo, particularly in the context of stem cell and preimplantation diagnostics. In the 1960s and 1970s, nobody would have expected that a conversation about human dignity concerned embryos. In those days people were worried about violations of human dignity in Latin America, in the USSR, or Vietnam, for example. Or they used the notion of dignity to describe the situations of the inhabitants of psychiatric clinics and jails. And 20 years before that, this notion was necessary and appropriate to express the horrendous nature of the deeds of the Nazis. Any satisfying explanation of human dignity has to take into account how broad the scope of its application is. Even a coarse survey shows many different areas in which we are confronted with morally questionable actions that we are inclined to describe as violations of human dignity: terror and torture, killing and rape, slavery, racism, sexism, severe hunger and poverty, endemic unemployment, political and religion suppression, the refusal of citizenship, being prohibited from maintaining personal relations, state control and the restriction of liberty, flagrant injustice, disregard of privacy, isolation, and insult. No doubt these cases differ in several aspects, but they have in common that they are regarded as threats to our human dignity. From the perspective of a moral philosopher, it would be unjustified to simply follow social practice and obligation to obey whatever behavioral demands flow from individual identity. Our identities are subjected to continuous reconstruction. What is not so morally innocuous is whether we care about our identities at all, since this is at the very heart of our conception of self-respect: self-respect is an evaluative attitude we have towards our individual dignity. And from the ethical perspective is something valuable that has to be respected. I wanted to sketch the understanding we arrive at if we take the three turns that I regard as crucial in the inquiry into human dignity. The negative turn, to start with violations, not only provide us with a philosophical motivation to look into human dignity but also gives us an idea of which features maybe be essential. The inductive turn, to consider the while range of applications in different areas of ethics, is a good antidote to rash solutions. And the historical turn, to take into account the historical bonds between human dignity and traditional conceptions of dignity, leads in the direction of an understanding of human dignity as universal, which is probably the best way of seeing ourselves. There are two possible understanding of the idea of a collective dimension of humiliation. One is: Can collectives violate human dignity? and the other is: can someone violate the human dignity of a collective? We ask questions like: Are the Germans responsible for the Holocaust? And : Do men add to the subjection of women by downplaying its importance? There is an ongoing debate over the question whether there can be collective agency and responsibility and how it should be understood if it exist at all. Although is a important debate, it is not the question I want to focus on. My concern is the second understanding of the question: Can someone violate the dignity of a collective? The initial response seems to be no, because collectives have no dignity. I think this answer is wrong because it rests on a confusion of methodological and ethical individualism. It is correct that collectives entities do not have dignity apart from their human members, but this does not mean that we have to look at individuals alone and not at groups when being concerned about humiliation. Humiliation is any sort of behaviour or condition that constitutes a reason for a person to consider his ir her self-respected injured. It is important to see what humiliation in the normative sense are about: They attempt to lower someone below the status of a human being as a person with dignity through an improper attitude ir treatment. In this normative sense, humiliation is close to dehumanization. Although there is a lot to be said about group rights, I will summarize. The view I presented on the different dorms of the humiliation of groups, of shared dignity, and of group rights can help is to overcome the danger of an evanescence of dignity which could come about through an attitude of radical individualization. On such account, persons are seen as atomic entities that do not need to have social ties. At the same time it should be clear that groups rights have to be based in ethical individualism in order to overcome totalitarian tendencies and the attempted justification of humiliation attitudes towards other groups. Only under these conditions will a peaceful coexistence of cultural diverse groups that nonetheless respect each other become possible. The scope of our autonomy is, according to Hegel, the reason why we recognize the other as person. If the other proves to be willing to risk his own life, we acknowledge or recognize this other as an equal human being. To some extent, Hegel comes close to Kant's notion of respect here. Hegel puts the existential absolutness in this way: "Self-consciousness exist in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it exist only in being acknowledge. The demand for recognition might become so strong that I am willing to put life at risk simply for the sake of honor. According to Hegel, these struggles are based in the fact that identities can be threatened or wounded by acts of misrecognition or disrespect. This because recognition is constitutive of personal identity. Within the horizon of recognition theory, we can conceive dignity preliminarily as a fundamental aspect of identity. The relation to oneself, which meakes up identity is, as we have seen a normative relations. This normative dimension is grasped in terms like "self-respect or " self-worth". Both of these terms refer to internal relation of a person to herself, but both terms also have an external dimension. Human rights law provides an example of the conceptual interaction between degradation and human dignity, embodied in the interpretation and application of the prohibition of degrading treatment, one form of harm within the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Is there not a sense in which we all know degradation when we see it? But then what do we respond when asked to give a practical example of degradation? Degradation is portrayed as a conceptual opposite of human dignity. And the right is interpreted  as aiming to protect human dignity. Certain conditions are simply viewed as unacceptable and improper for a human being. The Court admonishes a lack of respect for the person, including for a person's physical and mental health. Questions related to the significance of the individual experience of degradation are pivotal, yet they are not straightoward. Insight into this dimension of the concept of degradation emerges via the concept of humiliation. This principle is not explicitly clarified in the jurisprudence, but rather is substantial through its application. In exploring humiliation and this related principle, that humiliation is recognized as an emotional or feeling, but also as a state or social fact. The distinction between emotion and social fact entails that a person can feel humiliated without being directly humiliated. 

PISA 2015 Results

              This post is a summary of a book with the incomplete title above and published in 2016 at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/education/pisa-2015-results-volume-i_9789264266490.  And a report published at http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisa-2015-Brazil.pdf

               The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched the triennial survey of 15 year old students around the world known as the Programme for International Students Assessment, or PISA. The assessment focuses on the core school subjects of science, reading and mathematics. PISA is an ongoing programme that offers insight for education policy and practice, and that helps monitor trends in students' acquisition of knowledge across countries. Approximately 540 000 students completed the assessment in 2015 in the schools of the 72 participating countries. Every PISA test, one of those subjects is the main domain. Science was the major domain in 2006 and again in 2015. On average across OECD countries with comparable data in PISA 2006 and 2015 has not changed significantly. Still 13 countries show a significant improvement in science performance. Argentina, Georgia and Qatar students improved by more than 20 score points. Among OECD countries, Portugal improved by more than 7 points and Israel by 5 points. By contrast, in Finland, Slovak Republic and U.A.E., student performance in science deteriorated by more than 10 points. Performance in Australia, Czech Republic, Greece, China, Hungary and New Zealand deteriorated betweeen 5 and 10 points. Student's current and future engagement with science is primarily shaped by two forces: how students think about themselves and their atitudes towards science and towards science-related activities, that is, whether they perceive these activities as important, enjoyable and useful. On average across OECD countries, almost one in four students expect to work in an occupation that require further science training beyond compulsory education. Boys and girls seem to be interested in different areas of science. Boys are more interested in physics and chemistry, while girls tend to be more interested in biology. In all 57 countries that included questions work-related, more boys than girls  reported being interested on the topics of energy and its transformation. Meanwhile, girls were more likely to report being interested in how science can prevent disease. In PISA, reading. Canada, China, Singapore and Finland score well above the OECD average. In mathematics. Singapore, Hong Kong, China, and Japan were the highest-performing countries. On average, boys outperform girls in math, the difference is largest in Austria, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Germany, Ireland, Italy and Spain. In nine countries, including top performancers Finland and China; as well as Albania, Jordan, Malaysia, and Trinidad, girls score higher than boys in math. PISA consistently shows that poverty is not destiny. On average, in PISA 2015, 29% of disadvantage students are "resilient", meaning that they score in the 25% highest-performing part, despite the odds against them. In China, Estonia, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Vietnam more than 4 in 10 disadvantage students are "resilient". In Brazil, 9% of disadvantage students are 'resilient'. In recent decades. educationalists and policy makers have become more attentive to the dimensions of learning science. Concerns have grown that the proportions of students who choose careers in science are insufficient. While educating and encouraging the next generation of scientists, engineers and health professionals is one of the goals of science education, experts in many countries, including Australia, E.U. and the U.S. have recently expressed concern about declines in enrollment and graduation rates for science-related fields. The countries that have improved the most in PISA over the past decade have often shown the capacity to find solutions to the challenges they face. Such improvements could indicate that countries are harvesting some of early fruits of their efforts to improve their education systems. Colombia and Portugal are among the few education systems whose reforms have been succesful in improving student performance.

               The average performance of student in Brazil is significantly below the OECD average on science (401, compared to the average of 493), reading (407, compared to the 493) and math (377 to the average of 490). Brazil's average performance in science has remained stable since 2006. The fact that Brazil has managed to integrate newly enrolled students without a decline in its overall performance over time is a positive development. In fact, while results have remained stable in science and reading since 2006, the country's performance in math has improved by 21 points since 2003. However this trend is driven, in particular, by widening inequalities in achievement: while the best-performing 10% of students score close to the OECD average, the low-performing 10% fell further behind over the most recent period. The widening gap may underline the significant challenges faced by Brazil in integrating the weakest students in a fast-changing society, where opportunities are increasingly shaped by knowledge, skills and tech. In Brazil, 70% of students fail to achieve the most basic level of proficiency in math. Only three other Latin America countries come closer or surpass Brazil's staggering percentages of low performers: Colombia and Peru (both near 66%) and Dominican Republic 90%. PISA asked students what occupations they expect to be working in when they are 30 years old. This revealed a interest in science as a career among students in Brazil. In fact, nearly 40% of students reported that they expect to work in a science-related career, above the OECD countries average of 25%. In almost all countries, the expectation of pursuing a career in science is related to proficiency in science. However, in Brazil, strong interest in science as a career stand in contrast with students' proficiency. Unlike in the majority of OECD countries, girls in Brazil are more likely than boys to enjoy acquiring knowledge in science. On average across OECD countries, 20% of students reported that they had skipped a day of school or more in the two weeks prior to the PISA test; in Brazil, 48% of students so reported.  In Brazil, 44% of students say that their teacher adapt lesson to the class' needs and knowledge, and these students score 25 points higher in science than students who say that their teachers never adapt lessons.

Furthering Human Rights and Democracy Across the Globe

               This post is a summary of the book with the incomplete title above and published in 2007 at  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/publication-furthering-human-rights-worldwide-2007_en_0.pdf

               This book gives a general overview of E.U. tools and policies in the field of human rights and democratisation. It provides an insight into some of the major concerns which the E.U. tackles in human rights policy and promoting inclusive democracy across the globe. Central to the E.U.'s approach is the concept of human security, an idea of security which places people at the heart of our policies. A world in which people can live in freedom, security and dignity. Yet only in a world based on the rule of law and the freedom from fear and want can people develop their individual and collective potential. Respect for human rights is one of the most fundamental and universal values of our world. All of us have a responsibility to protect the rights of our fellow, be at home or elsewhere in the world. The E.U. takes this obligation seriously. We take a two-pronged approach: first, mainstreaming human rights concerns into all our policies, and second, financing projects to promote and protect human rights. The struggle to achieve the protection of the human rights of every man and woman has a long history. From their place in landmarks of European development, such as the English Magna Carta (1215) and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789) to the forging of the modern U.N. system, human rights have been embraced and violated by states across the world. Liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, are founding principles of the E.U. The E.U. promotes human rights and democratisation through various co-operation and assistance programmes with third countries and through the political dialogues that conduct with them. The specific objectives of human rights dialogues may vary from one country to another. In general, they aim at seeking information about the human rights situation in the country concerned; identifying practical steps to improve the human rights situation, and discussing questions of mutual interest and enhancing co-operation on human rights. The key challenge is for the human rights dialogues to go beyond a recitation of well-known positions and to lead to concrete improvement of the human rights. In many countries of the world, civil society organisations are working with dedication often in difficult conditions, for the effective protection of human rights and the advancement of democratisation processes in their own countries. They are strategic partners of the E.U. in the conduct of its human rights and democracy policy. Civil society play a crucial role in monitoring human rights and democratic processes in all parts of the world. On January 2007, a new regulation for the EIDHR entered into force. Now called the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). it provides continuity with its predecessor while introducing a range of changes, including a strong focus on democracy promotion and support to human rights defenders. The programming under the new EIDHR is set out in the Commission's Strategy Paper. It builds in the EIDHR's vocation to work with and through civil society organisations, and defending fundamental freedoms, which form the basis for all democratic processes and helping civil society to become an effective force for political reform and defence of human rights. Also to complement geographical programmes, the programming for the new EIDHR goves priority to supporting the international framework for the protection of human rights, the rule of law and justice and the promotin of democracy. Because democracy and human rights are par excellence issues of global concern andand constitute "public goods", global campaigns may also be foreseen, requiring a transnational approach. The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a major advance in the creation of an international justice system where perpetrators of international crimes can be held to account for their actions if no action is taken at the national level. The conduct of credible elections is vitaç to ensure democratic development and therefore, in turn, to protect human rights. Since the early 1990s the E.U. has provided increasing support to elections around the world both through electoral assistance and the deployment of E.U. Election Observation Mission (EOM). Electoral assistance is the legal, technical and logistic support provided to electoral events. Since 2000 over 60 EOM and 10 election support mission have been deployed to countries in Africa, the Middle East, Asia and South America involving the participation of some 5000 experts and observers in these missions. The aim of election observation are to deter fraud and violence and to build confidence in the electoral process among political contestants, civil society and the wider electorate. The EOM are usually headed by a member of the European Parliament. After the electoral process has been completed, each EOM produces a detailed report on the lectoral process for the country in which the observation has taken place. The E.U. plays a very active role in the new U.N. Human Rights Council. It introduces resolutions and gives statements aiming to protect and promote human rights. Despite the risk of politicisation of debates, the U.N. Human Rights Council remains the key forum in the worldwide promotion and protection of human rights, and the E.U. contribution to its discussion is a fundamental component of the E.U.'s external action. The U.N. has decided to double the budget of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The E.U. participates and makes statements in the annual implementation meeting which monitors compliance with commitments and the suplementary meetings which tackle specific human rights issues. The E.U. also attaches great importance to the work of the Council of Europe and its normative work to promote human rights standards and to pursue common goals.  The Council of Europe has also contributed to reform of legal systems and setting up effective human rights protection mechanisms in Central and Eastern Europe.