This post is a summary of the article with the incomplete title above, published in 2014 at www.mdpi.com/2075-471X/3/2/301/pdf
Since the introduction of new Web-based technology in the 21st century. We have witnessed personal information of targeted individuals being disclosed and displayed for the purpose of humiliation and social condemnation by the anonymous internet crowd, followed by harassment and abusive behavior online and offline, resulting in serious disruption of personal life. Drawing on socio-legal literature on shaming and punishment, and jurisprudence from the English Courts on defamation, harassment and misuse of personal information and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the relationship between the right to private life and dignity, the discussion will explain how the role of dignity has formed the development of the right to privacy where its value has played a distinctive role. It argues that the recognition and protection of the dignity and privacy of an individual is necessary in order to arrive at norms and values inherent in decent participation in the e-village. In this article, the term "dignity" refers to one's innate personhood, integrity and self-respect. This article analyzes emerging cases. Dignity should be recognized as part of a right to privacy, which should not be compromised easily regardless of whether one is at fault or not. One may question the value of fighting for privacy in the "digital age" when big data is readily available to identify individuals. However, it is exactly this development of the internet and technology at this time that warrant the urgent call for a re-examination of the concept of privacy and its core values of dignity. What we should also bear in mind is that this concept of dignity refers to an intrinsic value in each human being which must allow for freedom from humiliation and the development of physical and psychological integrity. The unrestrained disclosure of personal information in some cases severely threatens physical security and psychological health. What is needed, therefore, is the recognition and protection of the dignity and privacy of the individual in order to arrive at norms and values inherent in decent participation in the e-village. In what follows, there is a detailed discussion concerning the concept of "shame". Section 2, explains why civilized society should not use shame sanctions from a socio-legal perspective for protection of dignity, and against the dehumanizing effect in society as a whole. Followed in Section 3, this article will outline various international legal instruments related to the concept of dignity and its close connection with the right to privacy. In section 4, the rulings from the ECHR on the meanings of reputation, honor, dignity and privacy have given us new insight, despite the fact that the doctrine on dignity is not yet settled. The final part will
address the issue of why the right to privacy, including the aspect of dignity, should never be compronised in the face of so-called freedom of expression in online shaming. Convinced as we may be by arguments, any serious efforts to prohibit or regulate online shaming has to be anchored in legal principles. Massaro, Whitman and Foucaul may well have argued for a halt to public humiliation but the real challenge to be faced is to expalin why the law must recognize and legally protect the need for dignity and why such dignity should prevail. Dignity as a legal principle has been enshrined in numerous international treaties. For instance, the UDHR mentions the principle of dignity twice. When the protection of dignity is based on the noble ideal of respect for each human being. I will concentrate on the role of dignity in informing the development of the right to privacy inj cases influenced by the ECHR jurisprudence in the court. Then, I will discuss the other facets of the right to privacy, as manifested in the alternative legal remedies under harassment and personal data legislation. Lord Hoffman, one of the judges , was the only one to discuss the relationship between respect for dignity and privacy. In his judment, Lord Hoffman often used the term autonomy and dignity together, he ruled that, "what human rights law has done is to identify private information as something worth protecting as an aspect of human autonomy and dignity." To him, this protection consists of "the right to control the dissemination of information about one's private life and the right to the esteem and respect of other people." It is of particular relevance to our discussion on dignity the acknowledged that privacy rights are there to protect one's personal dignity and autonomy, he also addressed directly the fact that while a particular activity may seem undignified, it should not compromise one's personal dignity, and to take away that dignity strikes at the core one's personality. He ruled accordingly that damages awarded should compensate one's distress, hurt feelings and loss of dignity. The courts should emphasized that the principal value behind privacy rights is the protection of individual autonomy in the pursuit of self-realization and innate dignity. The disclosure and wide dissemination of the information, especially in the form of images, is particularly intrusive, it constitute a massive attacks in holding the claimants to ridicule, severe embarrassment or contempt. The intensity can reach such a level that their self-esteem, self-respect and innate dignity are severely damaged. The deleterious power of the internet in exposing an individual in a permanent form has been well documented. Since ECHR had ruled that there had been violation of the anti-discrimination principle. The court had elaborate on the meaning. First, it reiterated that the right to private life is assured that it includes one's right to live privately, away from unwanted attention, to pursue freely the development and fulfillment of one's personality, and to establish and develop relationships with others. Secondly, the court noted that the applicants
had been "marked in the eyes of society." The constant embarrassment and the continued burden that they have to face amounted to "possible impediment to their leading a normal personal life", which are relevant factors to be taken into account in the consideration. It was Marshall McLuhan writing on the phenomenon of e-media, who had foretold that, we would live in a state of eletronic interdependence in a global village. The speed of this e-media would wire us up to act and react to global issues instantaneously, continuously and collectively. This global village has every potential to become a place where totalitarianism and terror may rule due to the sacrifice of individualism and lack of in-depth reflection. He left us with a piece of advice, asking us to be vigilant towards the dynamic that tech would bring and to the impact of the media on our social interaction. Sadly, McLuhan's prophesy holds true for the 21st century cyber global village because we have seen that the internet is replete with examples of online shaming. Individuals are being persecuted by the anonymous crowd on the internet for the purpose of public humiliation, followed by online and offline harassment, leading ultimately to the ostracism of the individuals concerned from their communities, causing real and psychological harm to them. In our attempt to search for legal guidance from the ECHR, we have noticed an emerging jurisprudence on the recognition of one's innate dignity and its relational claim on how one should be treated by others as part of human dignity, forming the fundamentals of the right to respect for private life. Another research would be necessary to do justice to the issues of accountability but it is hoped, at least, that this article has laid the ground work for the recognition of a legal right to privacy, based on the right to dignity. Dignity has been described as a guardian angel hovering over our laws, It is perhaps time now to call upon our legal guardians for protection in favor of a proper responsible participation in the e-village.