This post is a summary of a book published in April 2016 with the title of, "Too slow for too long." at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2016/01/pdf/text.pdf. Every year in May I publish the GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth of many countries, and we can realize that, unfortunately the GDP growth of Brazil has remained among the lowest in the world since 2011, as you can check in these links from previous years: The GDP growth for 2014 http://www.thepeopleteacher.blogspot.com.br/2015/05/this-post-is-summary-of-book-published.html. The GDP growth 2013 and 2013-2011 among Latin America Countries. http://www.thepeopleteacher.blogspot.com.br/2014/05/this-post-is-summary-of-three-articles. The GDP growth 2012 http://www.thepeopleteacher.blogspot.com.br/2013/05/real-gdp-growth-2012.html. And finally, the GDP growth for 2011 http://www.thepeopleteacher.blogspot.com.br/2012/05/vol-teac-xxi-real-gdp-growth-in-2011.html. Something has to be done to reverse this low growth that cause many evils, mainly unemployment, with all its bad consequences. Brazil can not afford another lost decade like were the 1980s, but differently from the 1980s when was a world crisis, now only very few countries are suffering the downward in the economic activity.
Global recovery continues, but at an ever-slowing and fragile pace. Financial conditions have tightened even more outside the advanced economies. Increased net capital outflows from emerging markets could lead to further depreciation of their currencies, eventually triggering adverse balance sheer effects. China, now the world's largest economy on a purchasing-power-parity basis, is navigating a momentous but complex transition toward more sustainable growth based on consumption and services. Given China's important role in global trade, however, bumps along the way could have substantial spillover effects, especially on emerging market and developing economies. Emerging markets stress could rise further, also reflecting domestic vulnerabilities. For, instance, an additional bout of exchange rate depreciations could worsen corporate balance sheets, and a sharp decline in capital inflows could force a rapid compression of domestic demand. A period of low oil prices could further destabilize the outlook for oil-exporting countries, While some countries still have sizable buffers, these are eroding , and some countries already face the need for sharp expenditure cuts. In emerging markets, policymakers should reduce macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities and rebuild resilience, including by implementing productivity-enhancing reforms. In some commodity exporters, fiscal buffers can help smooth the adjustment to lower commodity prices, but it will be importasnt to plan for fiscal adjustment to durably lower commodity revenues and new, more diverse growth models. In others, financial strains may limit the room to implement a gradual adjustment. Exchange rate flexibility, where feasible, should also be used to cushion the impact of adverse terms-of-trade shocks. The economies of Brazil and Russia, which together account for about 6% of world output based on purchasing-power-parity exchange rates, have been contracting since mid-2014. Lower-than-expected gtowth in Brazil was amajor contributor to the downward revision to estimated 2015 growth . The outlook for Brazil and Russia remains uncertain, however, and possible delays in their return to more normal conditions could once again push global growth below the current forecast. The unexpected weakness in late 2015 reflected to an important extent softer activity in advanced economies. The picture for emerging markets is quite diverse, with high growth rates in China and most of Asia, but severe conditions in Brazil, Russia and other commodity exporters. Growth is projected to continue in the U.S.A. at a moderate pace in 2016 and 2017. Longer-term growth prospects are weaker, with potential growth estimated to be only about 2%, weighed down by an aging population and low productivity growth. The Euro Area recovery is projected to continue in 2016-17, with weakening external demand outweighed by the favorable effects of lower energy prices, a modest fiscal expansion, and supportive financial conditions. Output in the Euro area is expected to grow at about 1.5% in 2016 and 1.6% in 2017. In Japan, growth is projected to remain at 0.5% in 2016, before turning negative to -0.1% in 2017. In the U.K. growth forecast at 2% in 2016 and 2.2% in 2017 is expected to be driven by domestic demand supported by lower energy prices and a buoyant property market. Strong growth projected for Sweden, about 3.7% in 2016 is underpinned by expansionary monetary policy, higher residential investment and higher public spending owing to large refugee inflows. In Australia, growth is expected at 2.5% in 2016 and to rise above 3% over the next two years. In Latin America, overall growth in 2016 is expected to be negative for a second consecutive year (-0.5%). However, economic activity is expected to strengthen in 2017. Mexico is expected to grow at 2.4% in 2016 and 2.7 in 2017, supported by domestic demand and spillovers from a robust U.S. economy. In Latin America, the downturn in Brazil was deeper than expected, while activity for the reminder of region was broadly in line with forecasts. In Brazil, output is expected to contract by a further -3.8% in 2016 ( following a contraction of -3.8% in 2015), as the recession takes its toll on employment and real incomes and uncertainties continue to constrain the government's ability to formulate and execute policies. Brazil's government should persevere with its fiscal consolidation efforts to foster a turnaround in confidence and investment. With the scope for cutting discretionary spending severely limited, tax measures are necessary in the short term, but the most important challenge is to address rigidities and unsustainable mandates on the spending side. A reduction in inflation toward the 4.5% target by 2017 will require a tight monetary policy stance. Structural reforms to raise productivity and competitiveness, including the infrastructure concessions program, are essential to reinvigorate potential growth.
Below the GDP growth in 2015 in many countries, from higher growth to lowest growth, in some cases, negative growth or recession, when we can see the sign (-). This was the case for Brazil, Venezuela, Russia, Greece, Ukraine, and more very few countries.
Dominican Rep. 7.0% Ireland 7.8%
Panama 5.8% India 7.3%
Bolivia 4.8% China 6.9%
Guatemala 4.0% Philippines 5.8%
Costa Rica 3.7% Indonesia 4.8%
Honduras 3.6% Sweden 4.1%
Peru 3.3% Turkey 3.8%
Colombia 3.1% Romania 3.7%
Guyana 3.0% Poland 3.6%
Paraguay 3.0% New Zealand 3.4%
Mexico 2.5% Saudi Arabia 3.4%
U.S.A. 2.4% Spain 3.2%
Chile 2.1% Angola 3.0%
Uruguay 1.5% Australia 2.5%
Canada 1.2% United Kingdom 2.2%
Argentina 1.2% Germany 1.5%
Ecuador 0.0% Portugal 1.5%
Brazil -3.8% France 1.1%
Venezuela -5.7% Italy 0.8%
Japan 0.5%
Russia -3.7%
