Sunday, March 25, 2018

Philosophical Foundations of Privacy

                 This post is a summary of the chapter 2, with the title above, from the book with the title of, "A Buddhist Theory of Privacy." This book was published in 2016 at  www.springer.com/cda/content/.../9789811003165-c2.pdf?...

                Compared with other topics, such as democracy and justice, privacy has received relatively less attention from philosophers. This is quite surprising, since privacy is an important concept and plays an important role in our lives. Most academic literature on privacy come from law or communication studies, or the emerging field of Internet studies. In this chapter I review what philosophers have said about privacy. Thomas Scalon argues that there is indeed a common ground to the right of privacy, and that is the condition of 'being able to be free from certain kinds of intrusions' And it is the intrusions of our bodies, behaviors and interactions with others are some of the clear examples of intrusions that violate the norm of privacy. According to Robert Murphy, privacy was universally recognized in all societies as a necessary tool whereby people earn trust toward one another. It is essential in establishing a sense of the self and in social relationships. Murphy also holds that privacy is necessary in maintaining relationships even among those who are close to one another, as a means of keeping certain distance in case there might need to compare Murphy's view with the view proposed in the book, which is more concerned with how the information pertaining to an individual might be used or how one could protect the integrity of one's own sense of self. Westin argues that, as an empirical matter, privacy is also universal in all societies. Practices such as covering of the genitals, having sexual intercourse in a hidden place, are considered private and shows that privacy is practiced in all cultures. Practices such as having private conversations among trusted friends who do not want to share the information to outside circle may well be universal, but perhaps what concerns most people regarding privacy in today's world is that their private lives are being threatened by new technologies and by surveillance by the authorities. In any case, the question is: What are we protecting when we claim that we need to be protecting our privacy against unwanted intrusions? It seems that we are protecting access to our own lives in terms of our information pertaining to our identity, or our inner sphere of life where we do not want outsiders to know them or to make them publicly available. According to Schoemann, the various proposals of definition of the term start first with the claim that privacy is a claim, an entitlement, or a right to determine what information one should allow others to have access to.  In a well-known article, Fried writes: "It is my thesis that privacy is necessarily related to relations of the most fundamental sort: respect, love, friendship and trust. Privacy is not merely a technique for furthering these fundamental relations; rather without privacy they are simply inconceivable" Privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others. A person's privacy is diminished exactly to the degree that others possess this kind of knowledge about him, where personal information consists of facts which most persons in a given society choose not to reveal about themselves, or of facts about which a particular individual is acutely sensitive and which he therefore does not choose to reveal about himself. Schoemann's definition leaves open the question what is actually meant by the person whose access is limited, and another one of how much the limit should be. He gives three accounts on the person, namely information about himself, intimacies of his life, and his thoughts and his body. But perhaps there could be a case where the person himself or his privacy  is not exhausted by these three relatable to him, is obtained without his permission. In a different vein, Graeme Laurie argues that privacy should be viewed as "a state of non-access from others." What he has in mind is a definition that combines two major strands of privacy, spatial and informational privacy. Spatial privacy is the state of non-access to a person's physical or phychological self, and informational privacy is the state where others do not have access to a set of information pertaining to a person. Privacy and autonomy of the individual are closely related concepts. There are many arguments supporting the idea that privacy is necessary for autonomy. In one of the strongest support for the link between privacy and individual autonomy, Michael Eldred discusses Beate Rossler's work, "The Value of Privacy", where she defends privacy in terms of something that emerges from individual autonomy. According to Rossler, one has a normative claim to privacy when one's autonomy depends necessarily on the realization of privacy; in her words, "the true realization of freedom, that is a life led autonomously, is only possible in conditions where privacy is protected." Privacy is not only related to autonomy of individuals, but on a wider, social scale privacy also has a lot to do with justice. In fact, the concern for privacy of individuals could be regarded as a concern for justice. When someone has an unfair advantage over others, such as when one has the power to obtain information about others' personal and private lives whereas others can not do so in return, this would be a clear case of injustice. One of the most interesting topics in philosophical discussions on privacy is the conceptual relation between privacy and the individual. Perhaps the most salient aspect of privacy as a topic philosophy is that it functions as something belonging to the individual such the state is not justified in taking it away. We have seen that from the Roman times onward, privacy specifies what belongs to the individual and seems to presuppose a clear line between the individual and what is outside of him or her. Many arguments purporting to justify privacy rely on the conception of human dignity for support. Privacy is needed so that the dignity of individuals can be maintained. Defenders of the importance of privacy have generally followed two related strategies: 1) Arguments designed to show that respect for privacy is a key component in the regard for human dignity. The appeal here is to such conditions as moral integrity, individuality, consciousness of oneself as a being with moral character and worth, and consciousness of oneself as a being with a point of view, searching for meaning in life. 2) Arguments designed to show that respect for privacy is integral to our understanding of ourselves as social beings with varying kinds of relationships, each in its way important to a meaningful life.  The first line of arguments argue that, since individuals have their own moral worth, and since privacy is necessary for the expression or the viability of those worths, privacy is thus needed and is justified. Another point in philosophical analysis of privacy is the relation between privacy as a social norm and the privacy we have our own private thoughts such that no one else can have access to. Privacy as a norm refers to a social condition where individuals are accorded respect by others and the authorities so that their lives are not made open for everyone to see. Justifying privacy will be the topic of the fourth chapter, where we build upon the material developed here and look at how to think deeply and justify privacy from the Buddhist perspective. Privacy is a very multifaceted concept. We have seen that according to Daniel Solove, it can not even be given a precise definition, since any attempts to do it would miss some important facet of the concept that is also recognizably an instance of privacy. Taking a cue from Wittgenstein, Solove argues that the concept could be understaood more as a kind of "family resemblance,"  where instances of privacy are related one with another, but without an essential property linking them all together. 


No comments:

Post a Comment