This post is a summary of a dissertation with the incomplete title above submitted for the degree of doctor of philosophy at Northwestern University in Illinois, and written by Javier Burdman, published in 2018 file:///C:/Users/User/Downloads/Burdman_northwestern_0163D_14063%20(1).pdf
Ever since the end of World War II, we have been aware that totalitarianism represents a form of evil. Yet the acknowledgment of this novelty does not necessarily mean that we have come to terms with it, that we have overcome the temptation to go back to familiar ground by interpreting the new under the light of older concepts. After totalitarianism, we no longer see universal cognitive foundations narratives as a source of liberation, but rather distrust them as a potential source of domination and terror. At this study will show, the concept of evil is interwined with two of the most central concepts in contemporary political theory, namely, action and judgment. In order to fully understand the novelty of evil, it is not enough to obtain an accurate description of the psychology of the perpetrators, or of the historical causes that led to their crimes. If contemporary political theory emerged in part as a response to a new form of political evil, then understanding this form of evil is essential for understanding some of the essential presuppositions within the field. The problem of evil in politics is of course not limited to the regimes that we designate as totalitarian. Phenomena such as mass murder, systematic violence, torture, ideological extremism, and segregation, seem to emerge in the world. It would be futile to attempt to develop a grand theory that accounts for every political phenomenon that we characterize as evil. However, it is possible to inquire into the roots of our use of this notion, so as make political theory more reflective about its meaning, and thus of some of the most basic presuppositions that underlie its approach to the phenomena that we subsume under it, either explicitly or implicitly. At a general level, we use the word 'evil' to refer to actions that transgress universal standards determining what should and should not be done. Recent studies have analyzed arendt's understanding of responsibility in "Human Condition" and in her later writings. However, these studies do not address the connection between responsibility and Arendt's thought on evil in connection to totalitarianism. This is an blind spot given that, as will be shown, the destruction of responsibility for actions is an essential element of totalitarian crimes. Arendt claims,"we may say that radical evil has emerged in connection with a system in which all men have become equally superfluous. The manipulators of this system believe in their own superfluousness as much as in that of all others." This is a necessary condition for exercising total domination over men. This entails a lack of individuality, that is, of anything that distinguishes one man from another. From the viewpoint of totalitarianism, all men are or must be nothing. Only this kind of men can be the subject of total domination, in the sense that every aspect of their lives is controllable and made entirely predictable. The development of totalitarianism in power intensifies the elimination of responsibility for action. While the leader eliminates responsibility for any deed by members of the totalitarian regime. The secret police eliminates legal responsibility for any crime committed within the totalitarian state. The secret police does not prosecute people on the basis of what they have done, but rather on the basis of what they are and could potentially do. Lyotard finds an example of the relationship between political events and the idea of humanity in Kant's famous interpretation of the French Revolution. Kant introduces this notion as part of his attempt to respond to the question of whether the human race is morally progressing. In order to know whether human beings will act more morally in the future, if they are morally progressing, we need to know their disposition, which is impossible. This occurrence, Kant adds, could not be considered in itself as the cause of history, but only as a historical sign. The historical sign is then an occurrence in history that demonstrates that the human race has a good moral disposition, and is therefore on the path of moral progress. The occurrence that shows that the human race is progressing is not a deed, but rather, the mode of thinking of the spectators which reveals itself publicly in this game of revolutions, and manifests a universal yet disinterested sympathy for the players on one side. Thus, this universal and disinterested sympathy is the historical sign that demonstrates that the human race is progressing. In the "Critique of the Power of Judgment," Kant claims that, enthusiasm is sublime, because it is a stretching of the powers through ideas. The capacity of the spectators to feel enthusiasm for certain events is a sign that they are susceptible to ideas, and this susceptibility is already moral. Those who feel it are susceptible to the idea of morality, it nonetheless affirms progress, since the spectating humanity must already have made cultural progress in order to be able to make this sign. The capacity to have this feeling proves that we are susceptible to moral ideas. And given that this susceptibility is the aim of cultural progress, the feeling also proves that humanity is progressing. Humanity is thus the name of an ethical community on the path to moral progress, aroused by certain historical events. The problem of the banality of evil, which has concerned us, points to the generalized acquiescence and indifference mentioned by Forti. Although the analysis of parties and social identities is obviously important for understanding totalitarianism, an analysis of action and judgment at its everyday level is essential. In order to understand not only the emergence of totalizing ideologies, but also the acquiescence of ordinary people to these ideologies. It is at this level that ideologies seek the active complicity of individuals determined to escape the uncertainty that comes with responsibility. And it is this active complicity with the destruction of one's own responsibility, rather than an incapacity to take responsibility, that makes evil possible. Therefore, the fight against political evil can not consist in preserving or cultivating a capacity. Before this cultivation is even possible, one must choose whether to face the uncertainty that underlies any action and any judgment, or otherwise to hold fast to rules. To accept responsibility for this choice does not guarantee that we will do the right thing, but it makes unlikely that we will do the worst thing.
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