The Brazil of the Future: Towards Productivity, Inclusion and Sustainability

                    Since the creation of this blog in 2010, its counter of visualizations doesn't work and the same is happening with my YouTube channel since its creation in 2020. For no reason,  I'm being  harmed in so many ways and for so long. Why can I not have a YouTube channel and blog with their counter of visualizations working like everyone else? However, all the world is demanding justice and equality. The Brazilian institutions including from the government must do more to increase political inclusion, fairness, innovation and productivity. The world is demanding a fairer, inclusive and better Brazil, because they know about our huge potential and it must be heard for all.  If you want to know my channel here is the link   https://www.youtube.com/@lucianofietto4773/videos.  This post is a summary of the book with the title above published in 2023 at   https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/brazil/publication/brazil-future-towards-productivity-inclusion-sustainability

                                                                    What will Brazil celebrate 20 years out? Brazil aims to become an OECD country in this period. Yet the momentum for income convergence with OECD countries is weak, with its fortunes having already turned since the end of the commodity cycle in 2015. Since then, it had two recessions (2014/2015 and 2020) and become poorer. The labor market remains weak. Gains in reducing poverty risk reversing. Fiscal buffers have shrunk and debt is high. Projecting the recent past makes the future looks unpromising, calling for decisive changes. This book argues that for Brazil's development agenda to regain steam it will need to better mobilize all Brazilians. Indeed, a more inclusive Brazil will mean a more prosperous Brazil. This requires overcoming the country's historical legacy of exclusion. Brazil developed an important middle class, but vulnerable to falling back into poverty. Social inclusion is the process of improving the terms for individuals to take part in society. Social exclusion refers to the terms that keep or prevent individuals to fully participate in society and benefit from opportunities. Exclusion remains strong n Brazil and can harm Brazil's future. It will also be hindered if people are prevented from drawing on their talents due to discrimination. Exclusion will also reduce the political space to enact reforms that enable future prosperity. The economy, political trust and individual economic circumstances play a major role in Brazilian's well-being. Education underpins the experienced welfare of individuals and the Brazilian development narrative. More educated Brazilians experience higher subjective well-being, and tertiary education matters relatively more for the subjective well-being of the bottom 40% of Brazilians. In fact, returns to education in Brazil, though falling, remain high by global standards. Education is seen as key to Brazil's development, it is not surprising that, across Brazilian society, education is also considered the most important intervention to reduce poverty. This report explores a range of factors that matters for a better future, judging by these key drivers of wellbeing. They include education, income security through jobs and social protection, political participation and trust. Low social cohesion can also be linked to low trust, a structural problem in Brazil. Latin America region stand out as a relatively low trust region. Brazil ranked among countries with the lowest trust globally. Trust was lower only in a few other countries such as Colombia, Ghana and the Philippines. Tackling economic exclusion can set in motion a virtuous cycle for a more prosperous Brazil. Intergenerational mobility, which measures the degree to which the socio-economic conditions determines the position for the rest of one's life is stubbornly low. And Brazil will likely stagnate, unless efforts succeed in giving Brazil a new direction. Greater economic inclusion can set in motion a virtuous circle that can promote both inclusive and sustainable economic growth. Higher financial and human capital investment and greater productivity are needed to promote inclusive and sustainable growth. Brazil is at a level of development where it bears to switch to higher productivity, but it struggle to do so in sectors beyond agriculture. Investing in human capital is thus essential to achieve stable and positive long-term growth. Brazil's fragmented social fabric hampers an inclusive development process. Unlike many OECD countries. Exclusion persisted socially, economically, and politically. Brazilian history in the 20th century points toward a tight association between restrictive political institutions and income concentration. Since the deep recession of 2014-16, poverty reduction has been elusive. GDP per capita receded 9%. Many of the causes were associated with structural factors: low productivity growth, rising unit labor costs, demand reliant on consumption rather than investment, and a steady expansion of government spending. In 2014-2019, the slow job creation and limited expansion of safety net likely contributed to 5.7 million individuals falling into poverty, and 4.2 million into extreme poverty. Two years later. the poverty rate was 19.6%, higher than in 2013. The Unified Health System (SUS) greatly reduced inequality in access to basic health care due to key institutional innovations. Its creation included around half of the Brazilian population, one of the few examples in of a successful transition from a fragmented model (depending on employment status) to a universal and free healthcare system. The results of this reform made Brazil a showcase. But, the system has faced budget constraints, and Brazil will have to find the means to fund its future operations. To enhance education, Brazilian youth, especially from more disadvantaged backgrounds, will need education counseling, supported by more open data on labor market outcomes of different careers. Schools remain the best place for providing active counseling of students for the next steps in their education, while employment services can develop specific services to support out-of-school youth in vocational decisions. Brazil's growth model has run out of steam. Growth has been slow since the end of the commodity cycle. A more globally integrated economy, more diversified exports, and higher value addition would be consistent with a more dynamic growth model. Agricultural and mineral commodities account for about two-thirds of its exports. Goods with higher value added tend to be export within Mercosur, with the exception of airplanes. Services exports are also minor. Integrating with global value chains could boost Brazil's economic growth by enabling it to move up the value chain and tap larger markets. To do this, Brazil needs to become more competitive, especially in the currently lagging urban-based sectors, industry and services, which requires investment and productivity gains. Labor accumulation have been a major source of growth in Brazil. However, the demographic dividends are nearly exhausted, and Brazil is now one of the fastest aging societies. Although there is still some potential for growth through capital accumulation and higher labor force participation, productivity will increasingly need to sustain growth, this is where Brazil has been lagging. The slowdown in labor force growth could be part offset by increasing the participation of disadvantaged groups. Despite considerable improvements since 1990s, labor force participation by disadvantaged groups is still low, Participation is around 50% among women, while is around 80% for men. Reducing barriers in the labor market and in education faced by disadvantaged groups can accelerate growth. Commodities sectors have been experiencing productivity gains. A key challenge is to broaden these gains to other parts of the economy. Between 1996 and 2020 labor productivity grew by 5.8% in agriculture and 3.5% in mining. In manufacturing in fact contracted by 0.9%. Services stagnated with some exceptions like the financial sector whose productivity grew by 1.9%. Moving to a higher productivity path requires the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge. The Shumpeterian growth paradigm is anchored on three principles. First, innovation and the diffusion of ideas from other countries are at the core of the growth process. Second, innovation depends on incentives and the appropriability of returns. Third, productivity growth depends on the process of creative destruction, as new ideas and technologies replace old ones. This creates a tension between incumbent firms and potential competitors, with incumbents historically trying to delay or block the entry of new products or competitors. Despite the opportunities, Brazil have low levels of innovation. Brazil ranks below most peers on the Global Innovation Index 2020, which includes a set of input indicators and a set of variables capturing innovation outputs. In a country like Brazil, investing in R&D and engineering capacities to accumulate innovation is essential not only to promote frontier innovation but also to support absorptive capabilities that are key for catching up. Innovation requires complementary factors and political reforms are also needed to ease the way for innovation.

Building Trust in a Complex Policy Environment

                    Since the creation of this blog in 2010, its conter doesn't work and the same is happening with my YouTube channel since its creation in 2020. I've been harmed in so many ways and for so long, we can't tolerate all this abuses without consequences. However, all the world is demanding justice.The population must trust more in Brazilian institutions and what the world is demanding must be heard for all.  If you want to know my channel here is the link   https://youtube.com/@lucianofietto4773?si=ftiYIvhUgY3Hu6rg.  This post is a summary of the book with the title above published in 2024 at https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2024/07/oecd-survey-on-drivers-of-trust-in-public-institutions-2024-results_eeb36452.html

                    This report provides a comprehensive perspective of what drives trust in public institutions in 2023 by asking people in 30 OECD countries about their experience with, and expectations of public institutions at all levels of government. The Trust Survey serves as a foundation for the OECD's Reinforcing Democracy Initiative ( RDI). RDI provides evidence-based guidance and good international practices to help countries reinforce democratic values and institutions. Democratic government today stand at a critical juncture, steering environmental and digital transitions while having to face increased polarisation, heightened geopolitical tensions as well as social consequences of various economic developments such as inflation. In this high-stakes environment, building and maintaining trust in public institutions has emerged as a priority for many governments. In today's complex information environment, with the rise of disinformation and polarising content, how information is created, shared and consumed has an important link with trust. While trust in the media on average is relatively low and mirrors that in national government (39%), people's trust in government is closely related to media consuption habits: only 22% of those who prefer not to follow political news report high or moderate trust in government compared to 40% among those who follow the news. Additionally, while the use of statistics, data and evidence is shown to be a strong driver of trust, only about a third of people find government statistics trustworthy and easy to find and to understand. Overall, the 2024 Trust Survey confirms that it is the processes underpinning democratic governance that need strengthening to meet people's increasing expectations ensuring all people's voice are heard, strengthening checks among institutions, using better, transparent and verifiable evidence in decision-making, and balancing the interest of a diverse population are the best levers to improve trust, especially in national government. Trust in public institutions is the bedrock upon which public officials in democracies rely to govern and make policy choices to tackle pressing challenges. Trust is also an important indicator to measure how people perceive and assess their government institutions. In democratic systems, unlike in autocratic ones, citizens are not only free to report what they do not trust, but also encouraged to scrutinise government behaviour and show 'sceptical trust'. Among the different branches of national government, the executive generally elicit less trust than judicial system, but more trust than parliament. However, there are exceptions. In Czechia, Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden, parliament garners more trust than national government. Meanwhile in Chile, Colombia, Korea, and Mexico, trust in the judicial system is lower than trust in the national government. When dealing with the public, government institutions should foster a sense of dignity among their population. A basic pre-requisite for people to feel they are teated with dignity is to ensure fairness of treatment and processes. Further scope for improvement lies in the responsiveness of public institutions to adapt services to people's needs and expectations, particularly improving the perception of public employees' integrity, making use of innovation and people's feedback, allowing greater voice in local matters. Further, people's trust in national government is also positively related to confidence in one's ability to participate in politics. The effects of political polarisation on the functioning of democracy have been discussed at length in recent years. Polarisation embeds itself in political structure, narrowing the number of  "common ground" issues, this hinders governments' ability to enact reforms. The existence of a trust gap in institutions between supporters and opponents of the current government suggests that partisanship is becoming political polarisation. The gap is notably large in Canada, Finland, France and Iceland. Civil servants and policy makers, who interact with citizens on a day-to-day basis, can significantly contribute to building trust by displaying values of fairness and integrity. In recent years, concerns over the reliability and integrity of information have grown, with significant implications for democracy. Many people have concerns over the trustworthiness of media. As part of the growing difficulties with the evolution in the information environment, trust in traditional media is also suffering. An independent and pluralistic media environment is a fundamental principle of democracy as it facilitates the public's ability to scrutinise the actions of high-level political officials and policy makers.

The Politics of Democratic Inclusion

                       Once again I'd like to thank all people doing this worldwide movement for political inclusion stronger than ever. But for some unknown reason for me, even with this wish demonstrated daily by millions, few people, but influents, seems to be against my political rights.I hope that the will expressed mainly since 2020 election through this movement and expressed also by the results of election here since 2008 can prevail, like the humanist values must always prevail. Who is against my political rights must understand that I am not against them, and we all should join forces for the common good and together to build a better city for everyone. This is a summary of the book with the title above, published in 2009 at https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/183/edited_volume/chapter/1792179/pdf

                        The Politics of Democratic Inclusion seeks to contribute to our understanding of the processes and mechanisms by which traditionally underrepresented groups have and ahve not achieved political incorporation and representation.  The issue of democratic inclusion has been central to politics. The challenges are evident in the juxtaposed perceptions of historical dillemas. The suggestion of an open, pluralistic system in which diverse groups are eventually able to achieve influence in the political system and the political position of disadvantage groups are structurally and centrally problematic and unequal. Using different lenses and considering distinct phenomena, the chapters in this volume seek to determine how various institutions have, or have not served as mechanisms for democratic inclusion. The chapters evaluate and advance our understanding of the ways in which the structure, processes, rules and context of the American political order encourage, mediate, and hamper the representation and incorporation of disadvantage groups. The politics of inclusion are central to an understanding of the quality of democracy. The standards of political equality and popular sovereignty imply broad and deep representation of the governed. Not coincidently, recent decades also have seen the emergence of a rich body of research examining the political activitesand experiences of disadvantage groups where once attention to such issues was underdeveloped. The primary argument of this volume is that an understanding of the politics of inclusion requires close attention to the role of institutions. As we argue below, institutions determine the context in which political elites respond to demands for inclusion. Reviving group consciousness has been a key concept for understanding how minorities have overcome prejudice, discrimination and barriers to achieve democratic inclusion. The feelings of identification and solidarity that accompany group consciousness have helped motivate these groups to engage in collective action to secure equal rights in society. Studies of the civil rights movement, for example, suggested that group consciousness helped galvanize thousands of disadvantaged African Americans to engage in collective action and demand equal rights that would pave the way for their political incorporation. The classic literature on early immigrants to the U.S. also emphasized group identification as a resource for political engagement. Among the factors that promote participation: civic skills, psychological engagement and political mobilization, group consciousness was another psychological resource that made politics relevant to people's lives and supplied them with reasons to become active. Social movements, political parties and interest organizations, sit at the intersection between the public and the institutions that govern them. As such, they play a central role in democratic functioning. They socialize the public as to its civic duties. They mobilize people into political activity and involvement. They provide vital information about public debates. They recruit and promote candidates. They influence and organize the activities of government officials. They provide representation of diverse issues and interests. Political movements provide opportunities for the development of group leadership. Social movements demands create a context that encourages greater influence in government decisions. Social movements in many ways offers the most positive assessment of mediating institutions' potential for facilitating democratic inclusion. In the American experience movements often have functioned as effective mechanisms for those excluded from the promise of democratic equality to press for and achieve "new arrangements of power". Social movements as political forms flew largely underneath the radar of scholarly investigation. Sociologists, historians, and psychologists studied movements and their members, but tended to focus on their social rather than political features. Historically, most of America's experience with movements have been as catalysts for democratic inclusion, seeking to broaden democratic forms. Without going into details, social movements became swallowed up in a pluralist/elitist debate in which a well-informed and politically engaged electorate was viewing social movements as mechanisms for political inclusion. Sidney Tarrow (1998) has noted that when Alexis de Tocqueville visited America in the 1830s, against the blazing backdrop of social movements in his native France, he completely failed to recognize their American counterparts, including the religious revivalism of the period as well as the mounting contention over slavery. De Tocqueville missed the passions simmering in the moral beliefs of the abolitionists and in the efforts of Protestantism to appropriate interpretation of democracy to itself, while moving to stem the inflow of Catholic immigrants. American history was viewed more as a search for equilibriums than a crucible for change.